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The legal community is rapidly evolving: firms are more 
beholden to clients than ever, associates are growing more 
competitive with one another, and younger firm employees are 
more willing than ever to subject themselves to surveillance from 
their employers. These evolutions come alongside a boom in 
surveillance technology. Tech companies now provide services 
that can track every keystroke a lawyer makes on a company 
computer, analyze the content of their computer screens, or even 
develop algorithms to measure employee productivity. 
How does the modern law firm respond to these new 
technologies? How do they weigh their obligations to clients with 
the privacy considerations of their employees? This Note 
examines these key questions and makes a comment about the 
honor of the legal profession along the way. 
INTRODUCTION  
 Christopher Anderson had the beginnings of an impressive legal 
career: summa cum laude in his law school class, then several years as an 
associate at Kirkland & Ellis, then a partnership at Neal, Gerber & 
Eisenberg in Chicago.1 But Anderson never admitted that, at each stop, he 
had padded his hours, such that his billed time amounted to 125 percent of 
his actual work time.2 When he finally self-reported in 2018, Anderson 
had defrauded 100 clients of over $150,000 in billables after seven years 
at two firms.3 His firm fired him and repaid the aggrieved clients, but the 
damage was done—one more drop in an ocean of bill-padding incidents; 
one more argument in the public’s case against lawyers.4 
 Overbilling has plagued the legal community since billing itself 
began. Even in the Middle Ages, poets chided lawyers for their proclivity 
to overcharge,5 calling them “not psalmists, but harpists of Satan” and, 
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1 “Christopher Anderson,” LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/christopher 
canderson/ (May 11, 2020).  
2 Debra Cassens Weiss, Former BigLaw lawyer inflated hours because of 
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often motivated, undoubtedly, by anti-Semitic tropes.  
No. 1]              DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW             76 
 
 
more straightforwardly, “merchants of the Devil.”6 Today, most lawyers 
admit to overbilling from time to time, not by claiming undone work, but 
by performing unnecessary tasks.7 Firms only tend to catch the patently 
absurd ones. But the brunt of known incidents are self-reported—perhaps 
eighty percent of all documented misconduct comes from contrite lawyers 
with guilty consciences8—which means that even the most sophisticated 
firms rely on the “honor system” in one of the world’s most famously 
dishonored professions.  
 The type of overbilling that Anderson practiced is common 
enough, even if firms aren’t likely to detect it without thorough 
investigation. Instead of simply conjuring hours he had not worked out of 
thin air, Anderson billed slightly above every timeframe; he worked in 
increments that are almost invisible even when an attorney is sitting in the 
office, appearing diligent.9 For example, if Anderson spent 0.7 hours—
forty-two minutes—reviewing documents, he would bill 0.9 hours—fifty-
four minutes. The seemingly subtle twelve-minute discrepancies become 
more obvious as they pile on top of each other throughout the day; 
ultimately, Anderson logs off his work computer at 6:15 p.m., even though 
his billables suggest he must have stayed on until 7:30 p.m. Diligent firms 
could catch this kind of misconduct easily if they tried. 
 But Anderson’s modern misconduct raises concerns about 
stealthier types of overbilling. To see why, consider this scenario: 
Anderson does stay at work until 7:30 p.m., and bills his hours 
accordingly, yet his work for clients throughout the day is sporadic. Every 
twenty minutes, he takes a five-minute break to check his phone—if his 
firm tracks all devices on its WiFi network, perhaps he uses data, or 
perhaps he reads an article he downloaded at home. Perhaps he keeps a 
copy of the Chicago Tribune under his desk and tries to piecemeal his way 
through the crossword. Regardless, his computer screen is on, and the 
documents he claims to have reviewed are indeed on his screen for the 
hours he suggested. Anderson has charged the client 125 percent of what 
he should have but appeared entirely above-board.10 How can clients be 
certain that firms guard against overbilling when this particular breed is 
imperceptible to traditional computer surveillance methods?  
 To address these concerns, law firms will likely follow other 
sophisticated businesses into a new level of employee surveillance, 
 
6 John A. Yunck, The Venal Tongue: Lawyers and Medieval Satirists, 47 A.B.A. 
J. 267, 268–69 (1960). 
7 Nathan Kopel, Study Suggests Billing Abuse, WALL ST. J. (May 1, 2007, 9:04 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/01/study-suggests-significant-billing-
abuse/. 
8 Interview with Prof. Amy Richardson, Senior Lecturing Fellow, Duke 
University School of Law, in Durham, N.C. (Nov. 23, 2019). 
9 See Weiss, supra note 2 (explaining that the increments were gradual and went 
unnoticed). 
10 The only way to police this behavior, without appropriate technology, is to 
place an assistant in each lawyer’s office to assure that they are working 
precisely when they suggest they are working, which elicits a host of efficiency 
and privacy concerns beyond the scope of this Note. 




potentially altering the firm’s landscape as a workplace forever. The 
companies that make computers, WiFi, and email servers now have the 
capability to compile the data their users generate, and some have begun 
selling that data (branded as “workplace analytics”) to their corporate 
customers.11 While most lawyers at sophisticated firms have known for 
years that their supervisors could track their emails, these new analytics 
go deeper. For the right price, a firm could purchase an ultra-specific look 
at each employee’s daily activities.12 The newest tech allows for 
companies to track employee productivity in far more precise ways: 
essentially, everything an employee does in her office or does while 
hooked up to a company server could come under scrutiny.13 
 Different parties in the legal services economy might respond 
differently to these advancements. Law firms concerned about keeping 
ethics violations at bay might rejoice at the advent of workplace analytics, 
but they also may not want to hire more tech help to manage all the data. 
Clients who demand transparency and productivity from their legal 
fiduciaries might demand that billing be as thoroughly vetted as 
technologically possible. Firm employees who are protective of their 
personal data and workplace habits might rightly bristle at this level of 
scrutiny. This final group’s morale is essential to the profession for 
obvious reasons: if law firms already have a poor reputation for work-life 
balance, how much less attractive will they be for the brightest young 
minds if every firm must promise its demanding clients full-time 
surveillance? 
 This Note will discuss the challenges facing firms that might 
consider utilizing new technologies to increase surveillance of their billing 
employees. First, it will precisely define the new technologies—how they 
work and what they can accomplish for a business of any kind. Second, it 
will delve into the ethics rules that guide both firm and attorney activity 
concerning overbilling. Third, it will examine a firm’s obligations to its 
employees (vis-à-vis employment and data privacy law), articulating the 
tension a firm should feel between these rules and the ethics rules. Fourth, 
it will assess the potential of this technology flowing downstream from the 
most sophisticated firms today to a broader swath of firms in the future, 
along with the possibility that clients demand that their firms purchase 
these technologies. Finally, the Note will propose that firms, firm 
employees, and clients implement “surveillance regimes”— an amenable 
solution to overbilling.  
I. NEW TECHNOLOGY 
 Tech companies have already begun marketing workplace 
analytics to their corporate clients. Microsoft Corp., for example, monitors 
its employees’ email correspondence, server chats, and virtual meetings to 
 
11 Sarah Krouse, The New Ways Your Boss Is Spying on You, WALL ST. J. (July 




No. 1]              DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW             78 
 
 
gauge productivity.14 It recently used its own software to offer that same 
service to Macy’s, Inc., whose employees use Microsoft products at 
work.15 Freddie Mac also availed itself of Microsoft’s analysis to 
determine how frequently its employees took meetings and how many of 
those meetings might have been unnecessary or redundant.16 These 
companies are but a couple of the tens of thousands of customers to whom 
Microsoft could offer its workplace analytics services. 
 Moreover, third-party analytics firms can utilize modern software 
technology to conduct research for businesses. That’s precisely how 
TrustSphere contracted with McKesson, a pharmaceutical corporation, to 
understand why some McKesson departments have higher turnover rates 
than others.17 TrustSphere analyzed over 130 million emails to determine 
how frequently and quickly employees in certain departments 
corresponded, ultimately concluding that higher internal correspondence 
rates promoted cohesion within a department.18 And firms like 
TrustSphere  are discovering more ways to measure employee behavior. 
According to Sarah Krouse of the Wall Street Journal, “Companies are 
increasingly sifting through texts, Slack chats19 and, in some cases, 
recorded and transcribed phone calls on mobile devices.” 20 Startup Ambit 
Analytics even offers workplace analytics based on conference room 
audio, where companies can discover which employees’ voices are most 
persuasive and authoritative in a collaborative setting.21 Law firms might 
have an especial interest in this technology: they could contract with 
Ambit or a similar firm to calculate which lawyers are the best negotiators.  
 Despite all these groundbreaking developments, however, none 
has more potential for overbilling accountability than the computer 
activity analysis offered by Teramind. This third-party analytics company 
boasts over 2,000 employers in its clientele.22 Its services include “a suite 
of software that can take a live look at employees’ screens, capture real-
time keystrokes, record video of their activities and break down how they 
spend their time.”23 Teramind even uses an algorithm to categorize 







19 Slack is an instant-message communication platform that also provides file-
sharing, archiving, and searching services for teams; Its parent company, Slack 
Inc., has a market capitalization of almost US$16 billion. Slack Technologies, 
Inc., BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/WORK:US (last visited 
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primarily based on keystroke frequency.24 Teramind has also developed 
an insider risk program to protect attorney-client privileged information 
and work product sent abroad.25 Clearly, the company believes law firms 
are in the market for their services. 
 Law firms are indeed perfect candidates for Teramind’s analytics. 
Billing hours to clients is the backbone of their business, and clients are 
exceedingly wary of law firms overbilling them. Consider, for example, 
Christopher Anderson’s misconduct: a service like Teramind could have 
helped either of Anderson’s employers catch him before he could spend 
seven years defrauding clients out of $150,000, and the firms would have 
maintained a reputation of diligence and forthrightness with clients. Even 
Anderson might have fared better under this kind of surveillance, because 
if he were outed as a first-year associate instead of self-reporting as a 
partner, his supervisors might have allowed him to keep his job and 
salvage his reputation.26  
 Given the novel nature of these employee monitoring innovations, 
however, the technology might take some time to round into form. New 
tech often takes time and multiple models before it becomes an efficient 
“final” product. Even multibillion-dollar entities like Microsoft will 
struggle to keep all of their new tech bug-free, and startups frequently take 
even longer to work out the kinks due to their operations’ relative size. 
Over time, these products will become more and more reliable—and 
cheaper, too.  
II. ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO CLIENTS 
 The law on overbilling while doing hourly-rate work is 
straightforward: any lawyer who pads her hours beyond a certain point 
violates the ethics rules. The American Bar Association established a 
bright-line standard on this issue a quarter-century ago, stating that, in the 
hourly-rate context, “A lawyer may not bill more time than she actually 
spends on a matter, except to the extent that she rounds up to minimum 
time periods (such as one-quarter or one-tenth of an hour).”27 And if 
lawyers were wont to question what precisely was meant by “minimum 
time periods,” the ABA followed up this statement in 1996 by specifically 
prohibiting minimum time periods that are “unreasonably large or are used 
in an abusive manner.”28 Examples of unreasonableness follow: “Two 
 
24 FAQ, TERAMIND, https://www.teramind.co/product/faq (last visited January 20, 
2021). 
25 Teramind for Legal Overview, TERAMIND, https://www.teramind.co 
/solutions/industry/law (last visited January 20, 2021). 
26 It stands to reason that a firm would be more lenient with misconduct from an 
inexperienced first-year associate than an equity partner who has been 
systematically overbilling for almost a decade.  
27 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993) 
(discussing billing for professional fees, disbursements, and other expenses). 
28 Ethics Tip of the Month, February 2014, A.B.A. J. (2014). 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/services/ethicss
earch/ethicstipofthemonthfebruary20140/. 
No. 1]              DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW             80 
 
 
fifteen-minute charges for two five-minute calls within the same fifteen-
minute period seem inappropriate.”29 Lawyers understand that there are 
certain lines they ought not cross. After all, overbilling is not some 
ineffable mala prohibitum rule; it is fundamentally unethical and immoral 
to grossly overcharge one’s clients. This shouldn’t be hard. 
 Yet, most firms, especially larger ones, struggle to keep their 
attorneys accountable for non-obvious overbilling practices. Scholar 
Ronald Rotunda addresses the fact that overbilling has become especially 
prevalent in “big law” offices.30 As the size and anonymity increase in 
these firms, argues Rotunda, accountability goes down:  
Several decades ago, when law firms were much smaller, a partner 
might be a little  reluctant to do something that was ethically 
dubious (e.g., padding his legal bills) because  of a fear that 
if his client complained and his partners discovered what he had 
done, they would forever look down upon him. … The moral 
calculus changes when you do not even know the names of your 
partners or what they look like. There is less fear of shame, 
particularly when your rank and salary within the law firm 
depends on billing hours and keeping your clients happy.31 
Lisa Lerman, director of the Law and Public Policy Program at the 
Columbus School of Law, reiterates Rotunda’s “rank and salary” thesis: 
Many lawyers are preoccupied with gaining power within their 
law firms and with expanding their own incomes. For some lawyers, 
income is the clearest measure of their status. Preoccupation with money 
tends to have a corrosive effect on integrity. For some people, the desire 
for wealth leads to dishonesty because it's easier to expand your income 
more quickly if you don't bother about legal niceties.32 
Lerman33 and Rotunda34 cite evidence that attorneys are 
overbilling more aggressively—and more egregiously—than ever before. 
These diagnoses of the high-achieving lawyer’s psychosis matter because 
they identify the root of the overbilling problem: internal competition for 
status and bonuses. The growing trend of overbilling has led some firms 
to hire professional auditors to scrutinize their employees’ bills. Since the 
1990s, third-party companies who promise to review suspect legal bills 
have become increasingly popular.35 State bar associations express 
 
29 Id. 
30 See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers Are Different and Why We 
Are the Same: Creating Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote 
Ethical Behavior-In-House Ethics Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics 
Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 686 (2010). 
31 Id. 
32Lisa Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to Dishonesty: 
Lawyers, Money, and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 880–81 
(2002).  
33 Id. at 887–88.  
34 Id. at 687–88. 
35 For scholarship on the advent of legal billing, see Claire Hamner Matturro,  
Auditing Attorneys’ Bills: Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of a Growing Trend, 73 Fʟᴀ. 




concerns about the procedures and ethics of these non-legal organizations, 
especially since their presence might spur dubious litigation, threaten 
attorney-client privilege, or harm the legal profession’s reputation even 
further.36 However, bar associations also acknowledge that these firms 
should be allowed to do their work so long as they do not impinge on 
attorney-client privilege without client consent.37 
 Ultimately, state bars welcome technological advances that allow 
their members to better serve the first principles of legal service. A lawyer 
is, fundamentally, “a representative of clients”38 who must always 
“provide competent representation” to those clients.39 To maintain his 
status as a competent representative, the ABA Model Rules demand that a 
lawyer “should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, 
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”40  
 Overbilling denotes incompetence because it does the exact 
opposite of what a competent representative would do. Instead of 
efficiently taking care of a client’s business as a trusted fiduciary, the 
overbiller costs clients unnecessary money and conveys untruths to the 
client about the services he provided. An analogue in another field is Ponzi 
schemers: how could one reasonably say that Bernie Madoff was a 
competent handler of his investors’ money when his actions clearly 
demonstrated that he actually cost them what they entrusted him with?41   
 It follows that, since overbilling is an incompetent representation 
of clients, firm partners who oversee the billings have an obligation to at 
least consider “relevant technology” that could help them represent these 
clients more competently. This is the essence of the ethical argument for 
acquiring workplace analytics: a firm that ignores these technologies is 
willfully failing to do everything in its power to do right by its clients, and 
failure to do right by one’s clients is, by definition, incompetent lawyering.  
 Of course, there are financial incentives to consider when 
contracting for these services. Smaller firms could feasibly argue that their 
overhead costs are already too high to justify hiring one of these 
companies to scrutinize their employees further—costs that might 
ultimately pass down to the clients in heightened hourly rates. This 
argument gets weaker, however, as the firm’s profits grow. In her article 
 
B. J., no. 5, 1999, at 14. For a modern example, see Lᴇɢᴀʟ Bɪʟʟ Aᴜᴅɪᴛ, 
https://legalbillaudit.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (advertising that a third-party 
auditing service that analyzes bills over $50,000 from clients to determine if the 
client has been overcharged). 
36 See Matturro, supra note 35. 
37 See id. at 18 (noting that, in insurance defense contexts, an insurance company 
may hire an auditor to examine their legal bills who could require investigation 
into the specifics of an insured’s privileged communication with an attorney).  
38 See Mᴏᴅᴇʟ Cᴏᴅᴇ ᴏғ Pʀᴏғ'ʟ Rᴇsᴘᴏɴsɪʙɪʟɪᴛʏ Preamble (Aᴍ. Bᴀʀ Ass'ɴ 2018). 
39 See Mᴏᴅᴇʟ Cᴏᴅᴇ ᴏғ Pʀᴏғ'ʟ Rᴇsᴘᴏɴsɪʙɪʟɪᴛʏ r. 1.1 (Aᴍ. Bᴀʀ Ass'ɴ 2018). 
40 Mᴏᴅᴇʟ Cᴏᴅᴇ ᴏғ Pʀᴏғ'ʟ Rᴇsᴘᴏɴsɪʙɪʟɪᴛʏ r. 1.1 cmt. 4 (Aᴍ. Bᴀʀ Ass'ɴ 2018) 
(emphasis added).  
41 For background on Bernie Madoff, see Bernard L. Madoff, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs, 
https://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/bernard-l-madoff (last visited Apr. 4, 
2020). 
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on big-firm greed, Lerman notes that profits are continually increasing as 
firms consolidate into one another.42 At some point, earnings become so 
outsized (and hourly rates become so high) that partners at the most 
affluent firms in the country should not be afraid to suffer a minor setback 
if it means restoring confidence, for both their clients and the public, that 
lawyers are indeed billing their customers with integrity. 
III. FAIRNESS TO EMPLOYEES 
 American employees have precious few rights when it comes to 
data privacy. For now, firms’ concerns regarding employee fairness might 
be more normative; if firms are regularly watching every first-year 
associate’s keystrokes throughout the day, they might make the legal 
profession unattractive. Given the high supply of graduated law students 
relative to firm demand, perhaps this development would be a welcome 
thing for the profession. Perhaps, at present, firms have nothing to worry 
about here.  
 But this is an evolving area of the law. Employment privacy law 
promises to develop significantly as these technologies become more 
common in American workplaces, and courts have suggested that public 
opinion will play a key role in understanding what degree of surveillance 
is beyond the pale. As time passes and views on employers’ high-tech 
behaviors shift, courts will allow those opinions to guide them. 
Simultaneously, courts can build canons that distinguish acceptable and 
unacceptable employer conduct. It is too soon to tell, but one could argue 
that these courts will look to older notions of privacy and intrusion as they 
take these steps.  
A. Privacy Torts 
 Employee privacy law dates back to “privacy torts” that arose 
around the turn of the century. Privacy rights had garnered minimal 
discussion in the legal community until 1890, when future Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis and his firm partner Samuel Warren wrote a 
groundbreaking article, “The Right to Privacy,” in the Harvard Law 
Review. Spurred on by an increasingly aggressive journalist class, 
Brandeis and Warren argued that to protect the person, there needed to be 
a  “right to be let alone.”43 These rights were not merely contractable, or 
based on some duty of trust, but were “rights against the world” for which 
“the elements [of] demanding redress exist”44 in tort.45 The common-law 
mechanisms of 1890 could already protect privacy rights; judges simply 
needed to fashion them to use for those purposes.  
 Although the context of Brandeis and Warren’s article differs 
significantly from, for example, Teramind’s employee surveillance 
system, the logic they utilized applies to even the most cutting-edge tech. 
The authors asserted that U.S. common law must “protect the individual 
 
42 See Lerman, supra note 32, at 883–84. 
43 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 193, 
195 (1890). 
44 Id. at 213. 
45 Id. at 219.  




from invasion either by the too-enterprising press, the photographer, or the 
possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing scenes 
or sounds.”46 Perhaps the article itself spent most of its time focused on 
Gilded-Age paparazzi, but the basic premise it espoused—that individuals 
using the latest technology should not be able to unreasonably track your 
private behaviors—make sense in any historical moment. That Warren and 
Brandeis were discussing enterprising newspapers 120 years ago does not 
effect the broad implications of their argument; if anything, an algorithm 
that tracks your computer screen all day, every day (which could be used 
to fire you) seems more intrusive on individual privacy than a single 
picture taken by an overbearing journalist of someone in their home.  
 Moreover, the standards espoused by the article have gained 
widespread acceptance in the legal community over the years. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts mentions the right to privacy by name and 
introduces four specific wrongs that violate the right: (1) unreasonable 
intrusion on the subject’s private life; (2) appropriation of name or 
likeness, (3) unreasonable publicity of private life, and (4) publicity that 
places the subject of the surveillance in a false light to the public.47 While 
the latter three rights have little to do with employers monitoring their 
employees, the first—intrusion—might prove essential, given certain 
interpretations.  
B. Current Interpretation of Right Against Intrusion 
 Some of the key principles underlying the modern intrusion tort 
come from the 1987 case O’Connor v. Ortega, where the Supreme Court 
liberally construed an employee’s right against searches from his 
employer.48 Napa State Hospital placed Ortega, one of its employees, on 
administrative leave for suspicion of impropriety, then searched his office 
for evidence (without his consent) while he was on leave.49 The Court held 
the public hospital liable for this employee search under the Fourth 
Amendment, because they violated Ortega’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”50 In so holding, the Court emphasized that: 
Not everything that passes through the confines of the business 
address can be  considered part of the workplace context. . . . 
While whatever expectation of privacy the employee has in the 
existence and the outward appearance of the luggage is affected 
by its presence in the workplace, the employee's expectation of 
privacy in the contents of [an employee’s personal property] is not 
affected in the same way. The appropriate standard for a 
workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece of closed 
 
46 Id. at 206 (emphasis added).  
47 Rᴇsᴛᴀᴛᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ (Sᴇᴄᴏɴᴅ) ᴏғ Tᴏʀᴛs § 652A. 
48 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
49 Id. at 713–14.  
50 Id. at 718 (“The Court of Appeals concluded that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his office, and five Members of this Court agree with 
that determination.”). 
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personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that happens to be 
within the employer's business address.51 
Though the Supreme Court has not commented on this matter, some circuit 
courts have argued that the O’Connor presumption, at least with respect 
to public entities, against searching employee’s personal items can be 
refuted if the employer publishes a policy reserving the right to conduct 
such searches.52 
 Applying the reasoning in O’Connor to modern cases of electronic 
employee surveillance provides some answers to how far employers can 
go. Most fundamentally, an employee possesses a reasonable expectation 
of privacy against a search of her personal effects that might be refuted by 
a stated employee policy allowing such searches. Public employees who 
use their personal cell phones to surf the internet on company property, or 
to use state government wi-fi, might compare these devices to the 
“personal luggage” referenced in O’Connor, such that employers cannot 
search them amid overbilling investigations. Regardless, O’Connor 
predates the internet and most modern forms of communication; today’s 
Court might allow itself to develop an entirely new canon of law for 
electronic surveillance if they take on such a case.   
 Federal and state statutes impose burdens on employers, but the 
burdens rarely pose material challenges for employers who want to study 
employee conduct. For example, some states demand that employers alert 
their employees when surveillance occurs, but once the employer makes 
this notification, it can begin its surveillance practices in earnest.53 The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (the “ECPA”) prohibits 
the interception of many kinds of electronic communication, including 
emails, Slack chats, and instant messages, but offers exceptions for 
employers when (1) the employee consents to the surveillance, or (2) when 
the employer provides the system through which the communication 
occurs.54 While some state laws supplement these lax requirements with 
slightly more stringent ones,55 the general tone of the employee electronic 
 
51 Id. at 716.  
52 See, e.g., Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
a government employer’s reservation of the right to inspect laptops left no room 
for an employee to have a reasonable expectation of privacy when the search 
occurred); Biby v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. at Lincoln, 419 F.3d 845 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that if a public university’s computer policy permits searches, 
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists for students who are subject to such 
searches). 
53 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 19, § 705; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-48d. 
54 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2511. The statute also excepts employee surveillance 
that an employer conducts on devices used within the “course of ordinary 
business,” but only when such surveillance occurs non-continuously. The 
noncontinuity requirement precludes tech like Teramind and Microsoft’s from 
enjoying the exception.  
55 See, e.g., Maryland Wiretap & Electronic Surveillance Act, Md. Code Ann. 
§ 10-401 through § 10-414 (providing that, to lawfully intercept communication 
from its employees, employers must have the consent of both the sender and the 
receiver of the communication); PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA, GENERAL ORDER 107-B (adopted July 1, 1983) (providing that 




surveillance statutes is clear: as soon as employees are properly notified 
of the policy, the surveillance can commence. Moreover, these laws only 
cover communications between two parties; employees’ private activities 
(like checking NFL box scores) on employer systems (like a work 
computer or work wi-fi) are fair game for surveillance.  
 On the whole, current U.S. law on data privacy in the workplace 
suggests that employees have minimal rights against surveillance. Perhaps 
employees enjoy a default right to privacy under O’Connor and the ECPA, 
but this right can easily be abrogated by employee consent to 
surveillance—which, in the real world, tends to happen by employees 
absentmindedly clicking through a series of warnings on a computer 
screen before logging in. If an employee felt violated or trespassed upon 
by a surveillance regime, she could reject it by quitting the job, but this is 
not exactly an equitable solution to the privacy concern. For most people, 
especially young lawyers who sometimes spend hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to earn the right to graduate law school and get admitted to a state 
bar, the option to resign from a job at which you feel too closely watched 
is fiscally unconscionable. Law firms can lay out their terms, point a gun 
at first-year associates’ heads, and dare them not to sign the dotted line. 
Most will sign. Those who don’t give their employers carte blanche for 
surveillance are increasingly unlikely to get a position in a profession 
where clients are up the food chain, negotiating with firms, brandishing an 
even more lethal weapon.  
C. Present Normative Challenges 
 The only real obstacle in a firm’s way, then, is not based in 
common law or statutes, but in a much more on-the-ground difficulty: that 
potential employees will not want to work at a place where their 
supervisors have promised to clients that every associate’s move could 
come under scrutiny. This development could, at least in theory, reach all 
the way down to college upperclassmen if employee surveillance in legal 
jobs is significantly higher than in other occupations. Law already has 
notorious problems with sleep deprivation, alcoholism, depression, and 
poor work/life balance—not quite an encouraging set of features for 
college students considering career paths. Adding increased surveillance 
onto those challenges might be enough to scare the best and brightest 
students away for good. If that transpires, clients will, ironically, receive 
inferior service in the long run. 
 But this argument could be refuted in at least four ways. First, the 
legal market is already oversaturated. A lower quantity of lawyers could 
mean fewer firms feel the need to expand, which would lead them to hire 
fewer associates.56 Second, young people (who comprise the vast majority 
of the profession’s new entrants) are less worried about data privacy than 
 
monitored phone calls include a beep or some kind of verbal message to indicate 
the surveillance so those who speak after the notification have constructively 
consented to it).  
56 See Lawyers, Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜ ᴏғ Lᴀʙᴏʀ Sᴛᴀᴛɪsᴛɪᴄs, https://www.bls.gov/ 
ooh/legal/lawyers.htm (noting that “more students are graduating from law school 
each year than there are jobs available”) [hereinafter LABOR STATISTICS]. 
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older people (who comprise the vast majority of senior partners at firms 
where purchasing this technology might make sense). While recent studies 
suggest that both young and old have concerns about their traceable 
conduct in the modern age, a 2013 study shows that millennials 
consistently display less distrust in those who may be watching them.57 
Third, perhaps the people who get scared away due to increased 
surveillance were not the kind of people that the legal community needed 
to join its ranks anyway: those who are above reproach have less to worry 
about in terms of how they use their work-related information. Fourth, it 
is possible that even a significant increase in large law firms’ employee 
surveillance measures would fail to make a ripple in the market since many 
of the most fundamental aspects of law practice are unknown to a 
surprising amount of law students.  
 Combine these counterarguments with the fact that employers 
enjoy in surveillance contexts, and the grass could not be greener for firms 
seeking to purchase these technologies. Even after a quarter-century with 
the internet and an extremely innovative tech industry, the legal markets 
are not yet resistant to unchecked employee surveillance. Law firms, who 
have a host of ethical obligations to clients, should at least take note of this 
reality and analyze surveillance opportunities while they are available.  
D. Future Legal Concerns 
 At this juncture, firms seem to face few obstacles in imposing 
stricter surveillance regimes—they have essentially all the power over 
their employees—but this may not be the lay of the land for much longer. 
The Supreme Court took note of the role evolving public opinion might 
play in these cases while deciding City of Ontario v. Quon: 
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information 
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in 
what society accepts as proper behavior. . . .  [M]any employers 
expect or at least tolerate personal use of such equipment by 
employees because it often increases worker efficiency.. . . [The] 
law is beginning to  respond to these developments, as some 
States have recently passed statutes requiring employers to notify 
employees when monitoring their electronic communications. At 
present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law’s 
treatment of them, will evolve.58 
In City of Ontario, the plurality cited this rationale as it expressly avoided 
making a broad constitutional conclusion about the rights public 
employees deserve under the Fourth Amendment. “A broad holding 
concerning employees' privacy expectations vis-á-vis employer-provided 
technological equipment might have implications for future cases that 
cannot be predicted,” the Court said.59 “It is preferable to dispose of this 
 
57 Hadley Malcolm, Millennials Don’t Worry about Online Privacy, USA Tᴏᴅᴀʏ 
(Apr. 21, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/04/21 
/millennials-personal-info-online/2087989/. 
58 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
59 Id. at 760. 




case on narrower grounds.”60 But the fact that the Court suggested change 
on the horizon might not be the only worry employers have about 
surveillance in the coming years. If the public frowns upon more zealous 
surveillance, elected officials will respond in kind with statutes, and the 
reasonable-expectation standard adopted by the Court will allow the 
public to guide its decision-making on this issue as well.  
IV. FUTURE DOWNSTREAM ADVANCEMENTS 
 As time passes, individual tech will become more affordable and 
accessible to less affluent firms. “As technology gets more advanced, 
prices drop and products get better,” says Matt Rossoff of the Business 
Insider.61 This is a self-evident truth for the twenty-first century: name the 
groundbreaking innovation of ten years ago and find most of those once-
heralded products sitting in a landfill somewhere, or on sale in a secondary 
market for an infinitesimal fraction of the original price. A high-end 
innovation in today’s market like Teramind will likely be run-of-the-mill 
by 2030.  
 As the tech continues to advance and increasingly invasive 
employee surveillance services become more widespread, clients will 
likely demand that law firms intensify their own monitoring practices. 
Today’s clients are as empowered as ever; the consolidation of major firms 
and the lessons learned from the late-2000s financial crisis have made 
legal services a “buyer’s market” like never before.62 Thus, even if firms 
choose not to address innovations in employee surveillance now, their 
clients will undoubtedly begin to pressure them to do so as those services 
become more prevalent and more affordable.63 No matter a firm’s size, 
today is the day to face the tensions that heightened surveillance might 
create. From a business perspective, it is imperative to know about this 
service before clients start requesting it.   
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 No firm can afford to simply ignore the innovations taking place 
in employee monitoring, but precisely what surveillance regime a firm 
should choose will depend on their current circumstances. Although each 
firm has countless idiosyncrasies, this Note lays out three general options 
that firms can take to prepare for the future while maintaining a healthy 
office environment in the present. After a firm chooses the general route it 
will take, it can tinker with the specifics to discover a more individually-
tailored approach.  
 
60 Id. 
61 Matt Rosoff, Why Is Tech Getting Cheaper?, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 16, 2015). 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/why-is-tech-getting-cheaper/. 
62 See Jᴏʀᴅᴀɴ Fᴜʀʟᴏɴɢ, Lᴀᴡ Is ᴀ Bᴜʏᴇʀ’s Mᴀʀᴋᴇᴛ (2017); see also LABOR 
STATISTICS, supra note 56 (“Clients are expected to cut back on legal expenses 
by demanding less expensive rates and scrutinizing invoices.”) 
63 Interview with Amy Richardson, Senior Lecturing Fellow, Duke University 
School of Law, Durham, N.C. (Nov. 23, 2019). 
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A. Avoid the Technology (for now) and Continue Standard 
Surveillance Procedure. 
 The argument for this course of action is simple: the long-run 
disadvantages of paying for cutting-edge workplace64 analytics would 
outweigh the benefits. Perhaps the advantages do indeed outweigh the 
disadvantages in the immediate present, especially for a firm whose clients 
are not yet aware of the fact that every single lawyer in the firm could have 
their activities tracked throughout the office, from hours graded on 
productivity to voice inflections in conference-room strategy meetings. As 
mentioned in Part V supra, most clients will not be unaware of this 
technology for much longer. Still, they are unaware now—so what’s the 
harm of waiting a few more years before seriously considering 
implementing the technology?  
 This surveillance regime makes the most sense for firms whose 
clients are probably several years away from learning about monitoring 
innovations. These types of clients are likely less sophisticated and 
probably do not have the funds to scrutinize their law firm’s billing 
procedures; further, they are probably paying a lower hourly billable rate 
than more sophisticated clients, whose overbilling risk is higher. While 
firms who serve these clients still ought to convey that they are serious 
about employee monitoring and accurate billing, it’s not yet time to 
splurge for a new product that might take a few years to be free of bugs 
and kinks. So long as these firms have earned a positive, ethical reputation 
with their clients and the clients are not focused on discovering new ways 
to scrutinize billables, the status quo ante will do just fine.   
B. Purchase the Technology and Only Punish the Egregious 
Overbilling Cases.  
 This approach attempts to square the challenges of evolving with 
an ever-changing tech market, slaking an increasingly demanding client 
base, and respecting the employee behavior status quo leading to 
significant financial success for thousands of sophisticated law firms 
across the country. Under this surveillance regime, firms would proclaim 
to clients that they have redoubled their efforts to preserve integrity in their 
billing practices by implementing the latest, most innovative monitoring 
tech available. However, on the inside, the frequency of punishment 
remains essentially the same: self-reporting employees can still face 
discipline, of course, but only the most brazen overbilling offenders 
receive punitive treatment from the firm. Perhaps a firm adopting this 
strategy might even hold a brief seminar with their employees where they 
explain the new technology, what to avoid, and when bill-padding will rise 
to a level that requires disciplinary measures. Firms who adopt this 
solution successfully will leave both their clients and their employees at 
ease while solidifying their outward-facing reputation as above-board in 
their billing practices.  
 
64 Namely, the direct financial costs and employee discontent.  




 Firms who have strong relationships with sophisticated clients, 
and minimal history of billing issues, should embrace this approach. When 
these types of clients inevitably request to minimize their billing expenses 
as much as possible, their firms can reassure them that they are working 
with superior technology to assure that everything will continue to run 
smoothly. Coupling a loudly-proclaimed tech advantage with a relatively 
unaffected employee base makes sense for firms whose clients want 
advantages, and whose employees have already done well in their efforts 
to bill accurately. For firms with less-confident clients, or a significant 
history of bill-padding, purchasing the tech while essentially maintaining 
the same level of surveillance could be dangerous—it would not preserve 
confidence if the punishment system remains the same, and it would not 
make the employees behave any better. A firm in this latter state gains 
little to no cost advantage from buying the technology; moreover, they are 
not acting any more ethical just because they bought it.   
C. After Extensive Communication with Lawyers and Other Billing 
Employees, Purchase the Technology and Establish Bright-Line 
Standards of Punishable Conduct, then Enforce Them. 
 This regime stresses transparency and communication—two 
crucial components of any new employee surveillance initiative. However, 
unlike the approach in section VI-B supra, this makes a concerted effort 
to enhance genuinely employee behavior and crackdown on overbilling. 
Firms might purchase Teramind’s sliding-scale service and tell their 
employees that any productivity level below a certain point will result in 
heightened scrutiny on their file, with a system of increasingly strong 
penalties for repeat offenses. Or perhaps a firm could pay for Microsoft’s 
analytics and tell employees that the firm reserves the right to examine 
every email they exchange. Regardless, the chief end of the process should 
be raising employee awareness so that every lawyer knows precisely 
what’s expected of her.  
 Firms who choose this strategy will most likely have demanding 
clients and demanding employees—hardly a bad combination. Clients will 
find reassurance in adopting of the new technology and the heightened 
communication; employees will appreciate the fact that, while the firm is 
indeed “spying” on them, they know what to expect and what to avoid. 
Moreover, this plan has the benefit of actually being the most ethical 
option: it assures proper billing while giving employees a fair shake. 
Generally speaking, law firms will most competently serve their clients 
under this surveillance regime. While it might cost some money and put a 
bug of paranoia in some naïve associates’ ears, it is clearly the best choice 
for the future for most firms that have reason to purchase the new 
technology.   
CONCLUSION 
 The legal profession is unlikely to ever “solve” overbilling, and it 
has a similarly slim chance of making its jobs more attractive as clients 
have more leverage to demand compliance. But these realities do not 
exempt a law firm from incorporating new monitoring technologies into 
their standard employee surveillance procedure. When the ABA said in its 
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Model Rules that a lawyer was, first and foremost, “a representative of 
clients,” it surely must have meant that prioritizing client interest was a 
lawyer’s, or a law firm’s, fundamental professional purpose. As 
companies like Microsoft and Teramind continue to develop their 
offerings, every firm in the country should pay attention and genuinely 
consider using them to help themselves be the best lawyers they can be.  
 Of course, employee rights matter as well—especially those of 
relatively helpless junior associates who might not be long for a profession 
that systematically spies on them. For every Christopher Anderson, many 
other young attorneys deserve to be treated with decency and only a 
reasonable amount of scrutiny. These recent law school graduates are 
already walking into positions that notoriously induce mental illness, 
alcoholism, and overwhelming stress. As this new horizon of employment 
law develops over the next few years, firms owe it to their field to be fair 
and understanding with their associates and to deemphasize their most 
destructively competitive earning and positional structures so that the 
temptation to pad bills is not so enticing. 
 Employee monitoring innovations could signal a fresh start for 
firms that have a reputation for incubating internal misconduct. Instead of 
fostering an environment where young associates like Christopher 
Anderson feel compelled to defraud clients to get ahead, firms can rebuild 
their cultures to focus on transparency, collegiality, and ethicality. That 
employees will be more closely monitored in the coming decades is almost 
inevitable. Firms can respond to this development by promising both their 
employees and their clients new incentive structures that comport with a 
transparent billing system. By doing so, our profession can not only evolve 
with the times and maintain client confidence but project a new, positive 
image of the lawyer’s psychosis—a makeover we have sorely needed for 
centuries.  
